Valley of the Shadow of Death

[Jim McDougall]

In the warfare in the times of the Crimean War (1853-56), the capture of cannons as trophies even more than their obvious importance as weapons to be reused in battle, was a well established objective. To 'lose' them in a battle was essentially a disgrace. In a battle where defense was no longer tenable, it was the duty of the gunners to 'spike' or disable the guns rather than allow them to be taken for reuse.

This military notion was essentially behind what became one of the most glorified, tragic, yet militarily inconsequential events in military history. This entire action in the Battle of Balaclava was the result of poor leadership, the obstinance of commanding officers, and this very notion about 'guns'.

In the defenses set up by the British in these areas near Balaclava, which were basically two valleys, North and South, separated by a long ridge called 'Causeway Heights' as the key supply road (Wozoronov Road) ran along the top of this terrain.
The British built 6 artillery redoubts along this escarpment, however only 4 were actually armed, while 5 and 6 were not. These were clumsily constructed and weak, armed with British 12 pounder naval guns and manned by Turks ((Warner, p.65).

In actions of earlier in these areas, while the British forces had scored some notable victory with the Heavy Brigade and infantry over Russian forces, a Russian field battery had captured these redoubts after they were abandoned by the Turks manning them.

In the scope of all this, the British commander overall was Lord Raglan, a venerable officer of the Napoleonic campaigns, who was situated in an elevated vantage point some 600 feet above the terrain of these valleys and the Causeway Heights.

To his dismay, he could see the Russians with artillery horses with lasso tackle preparing to remove the captured British guns from the redoubts (Woodham-Smith, p.231). This would not do! With this, he issued one of the most fateful orders in military history, to advance the Light Brigade to the Heights to prevent the Russians from carrying away the guns. The written order was given to the young ADC to the Heavy Cavalry commander Lord Lucan, Lt. Lewis Nolan, who excitedly rode down the terrain to deliver it to him.

Frustrated at having been held back through the days action, Nolan gave Lucan the order, which made no sense to him as he was situated in the lower terrain and could not see what guns Raglan was talking about. Overcome by anxious rage, Nolan made the impetuous, and fatal gesture pointing in the direction of the North Valley rather than specifying the Causeway Heights.
Rather than further discussing the order, despite it directing the forces into a valley heavily armed on all sides by the Russians, Lucan stubbornly ordered the advance.

This was the entire issue, the personal issues between the officers drove the failure to properly understand an order simply to stop the unseemly removal of the captured British guns which was offensive to the British Commander. There was no strategic or tactical importance specifically, and the order assumed that Lucan would know just what guns were meant.

As the cavalry advanced, at a certain distance it became apparent that they were not wheeling to the right, to the Causeway Heights, but instead riding straight into the North Valley into a suicidal gauntlet of Russian artillery on all sides!

As the brigades rode onward, the ranks were decimated in the horrific fire from all sides, the Heavy Brigade dropped back as the Light Brigade ahead rode into sure death. There was never a 'charge' ordered nor sounded (the trumpeter was now killed)....in fact there were lancers in front who reached the gun batteries with lances still in the buckets!

It was as if, the men of the Light Brigade had not expected this suicidal ride into blazing cannon, but expected to be directed into a flanking movement at some point. As they had not, and were fully into the hellish fire, the natural reaction is to get past it.....so it became a 'charge' out of pure necessity to get out of the line of fire. The entire point of this situation immortalized by Tennyson, "theirs was not to reason why, theirs was but to do and die".

In this thread, as I had mentioned earlier, I have hoped to learn more on the artillery aspects of this action in the Battle of Balaclava October 25, 1854.
While we know the British guns were naval twelve pounders, it is unclear how many were in the redoubts, and just what type of guns were they? It does not seem like they would have been on the usual deck carraiges as how would they be transported?

With the Russian artillery, what I have been trying to determine is, just what types of guns were they using, how many, and the types of ammunition being used (i.e. shot, shell, canister).
Also, were the Russians using the British guns in the redoubts or simply focused on taking them away?

[Norman McCormick]

Hi,
An 1821 LC sabre marked to Osborn, a mid Victorian regimental, Ayrshire Yeomanry, pillbox hat of the type common to the British Army of the time and a few photos one showing an 1821 pattern being worn and a retouched and coloured photo of Cornet Wilkin of the 11th Hussars. Both photos are by Fenton.
Regards,
Norman.

[Will M]

Norman I've owned two 1821p LC troopers by Sargant , identical to the Osborn pictured with washer and tang peened over it. Also marked A/4. Both had 33 inch blades and were for the American market.

[Norman McCormick]

Hi Will,
With the sword in hand I'm sure it is a crowned 4 which is of course a British acceptance mark. My sword has a 35 1/2 inch blade and is 7/16 inches thick at the ricasso. The blade is sharpened for the first 25 inches plus 4 inches at the false edge. I've no reason to suspect that this sword is not British issue. Thanks for the info, I did not realise that these were exported to the U.S.
My Regards,
Norman.

[Jim McDougall]

Thank you for these examples guys! It really adds great perspective here to look into the types of weaponry used in this war, and for purposes here, in this battle.
During the Civil War there was considerable export of arms and materials to the Confederate forces from Great Britain, as the Confederate industrial capacity was relatively limited to that of the Union. While the use of swords during the war was not necessarily prevalent, they were certainly present throughout.

With the M1853 swords, there was one British firm producing these for the Confederacy exclusively, I believe it was Isaac & Co.

[Jim McDougall]

Originally Posted by Norman McCormick

Hi,
An 1821 LC sabre marked to Osborn, a mid Victorian regimental, Ayrshire Yeomanry, pillbox hat of the type common to the British Army of the time and a few photos one showing an 1821 pattern being worn and a retouched and coloured photo of Cornet Wilkin of the 11th Hussars. Both photos are by Fenton.
Regards,
Norman.

This is an great M1821 example, and interesting with the Osborn markings. According to Robson (1975) this would date pre-1844 so was well in use by the Crimean War. That pillbox hat is amazing! I dont think I've ever seen an example of one of these.

[Jim McDougall]

In previous post I was describing the sword disciplines of the British, but in one line it was suggested that the British swords were as 'blunt as the Russians swords'. In further reading, this does not seem the case, though it is made clear that the Russian swords were indeed blunt.

In "Hell Riders" (Terry Brighton, 2004) very well researched accounts from Balaclava survivors better tell this.
p.94, as charge was sounded and the Heavies went into the huge mass of Russians (the British outnumbered by at least 3 to 1) it is noted they seemed astonished and went from a walk to halt, as the forces met Lt. Godman notes "...all I saw was swords in the air in every direction, the pistols going off and everyone hacking away right and left".,

The Heavies were vastly outnumbered and fighting uphill, but "..the Heavies swung their sabers viciously". with the Russians "...rather astonished at the way our men used their swords".

In this account it was noted that there were few casualties in the five minute melee suggesting the thick grey coats the Russians wore and that the British swords were not sufficiently sharp, and the Russians were worse as no attempt had been made to sharpen them (evidenced by the swords found later on the ground).

Lt. Strangways of the Heavies noted regarding a dead trooper of the 4th DG, "...his helmet had come off in the fight, and he had about 15 cuts on his head, not one of which had more than parted the skin. His death wound was a thrust below the armpit". (p.96, Brighton, op. cit.).

A Lt. Elliott of the unit had "..fourteen saber wounds and was recorded as 'slightly wounded' because only one of them, a cut across his face, had opened the flesh". (p.96)

Apparently the melee was stopped when Royal Horse Artillery began firing over the heads of the Heavies into the Russian ranks outermost, and their forces broke. (p.95, op. cit, Brighton)

[Jim McDougall]

In writing this thread, I just wanted to express its purpose (paraphrasing words from Tennyson in his famed poem). I wanted to illustrate how much more vivid and dimensional the weaponry in collections becomes when it is presented through the prism of the historic events, people and other elements that are associated with them.

The Crimean War is interesting as it is a contrast between older warfare technology and ways, and modern (in a sense) technology. It is the first use of photography in war reporting, changes in weaponry were in contrast to old forms. The Russians even had mines remote detonated by electric charge. Yet the mismanagement and conflicts of various kinds in the ranks led to the unfortunate outcomes in most of the 'strategy' and 'tactical oversights'.

The use of the sword in a time of modern warfare moving toward firearms in combat, had changes in their form being introduced despite this, as seen by the 'modern' (1853) mingled with others.

The old notion of 'capturing' guns was at hand here, and as I had noted, there seems a dearth of ammunition from these Crimean battles as souvenirs, though certainly they do exist. It is hopeful that learning more on which type guns were in use might help in examining potential examples which might be found.

I am hoping that this thread will not be seen as a 'history lesson' but might prove useful to those who have collected weaponry and militaria from this period in the contexts in which they served.

[Jim McDougall]

It has been a bit confusing sorting through accounts of the charge in quite a few books etc. as I wanted to understand just how many guns were the Light Brigade charging into. The numbers and positions of some vary, but it does seem mostly the Russian guns were of course field or horse artillery.

As earlier noted, the original intent of the order to the Light Brigade was to 'advance' to prevent the Russians from taking away the British guns in the redoubts on Causeway Heights.....NOT to charge the Russian guns down the North Valley!

The British guns were in four of the six redoubts captured earlier in the morning by the Russians, and believed two per redoubt. These were 12 pounder naval guns from the British ships and actually hastily constructed using boards from those same ships. Manned by Turks, they were abandoned after while under attack, no British support was forthcoming.

When Lord Raglan ordered the Light Brigade to advance to these guns, the order went to Lord Lucan, who was with the Heavy Brigade but in command of the entire cavalry there. He could not see the guns Raglan referred to, and Nolan , the officer delivering the order, in frustration pointed to the North Valley without pointing out the guns Raglan meant were on the Causeway Heights.

The Russians were using horses and lasso to move the British guns in redoubts 1,2,3 in #4 the guns were spiked and thrown down the hill.

The Light Brigade advanced knowing they were going directly into a gauntlet of Russian guns, not realizing they were meant to wheel right to the Causeway, not continue in a suicidal charge. The Heavy Brigade as well as the Royal Horse artillery were following to strengthen the potential action at Causeway.

As they advanced, the Russian guns on the left on Fedouikin Hills opened fire, there were 10 guns, the Brigades were moving at a trot and the pace gradually quickened, then as the other Russian artillery at the right on Causeway opened fire. Ironically, these were in the positions near the redoubts where the Russians were removing the British guns.

As this crossfire continued , the Light Brigade pace was feverishly increased as numbers of men and horses fell;
The French cavalry at that time took out and silenced the ten guns on the left, the Heavy Brigade seeing the cannons directly ahead at the end of the valley could see the hopeless situation and dropped back to retreat. With the guns silenced they were under no threat on the return.

The Light Brigade however, now moving faster, though no charge was ever sounded, were being torn to shreds by the Russian batteries to the right, along with musket fire from the flanks. The cannon at the end they were now riding directly into were the 3rd Don Cossacks with 6 pounder guns as well as the formidable 12 pounders known as unicorns. They had been firing round shot but were now firing exploding shells as well.

Almost ironically, among the men who had made it into the battery, in the chaos and melee, some were preparing to take the Russian guns! as I found in one reference. They were unable to regroup, and Cardigan told them they had done enough when the men insisted they were ready to 'go again' What was left of the Light Brigade straggled back down the valley.

As was well said in one reference " this charge was glorified by a poet, not a soldier".

The tragic sacrifice had accomplished nothing strategically, and in most military histories of the Crimean War, gets scant notice in the overall study.

[Bryce]

G'day Guys,
I was lucky to acquire this sword recently. It is a standard 1796 light cavalry trooper's sword maker marked to Osborn. What makes it special is that the scabbard has a silver plaque inscribed "Balaclava Charge 25th Oct. 1854". Both the sword and scabbard are also marked 17L 37. Richard Dellar in his book "The British Cavalry Sword 1788-1912" describes three similar examples. Two of these are also marked 17L and one 4H. Richard thinks 17L stands for 17th Lancers and 4H for the 4th Hussars and that these swords were presented to the survivors of the Charge of the Light Brigade. To date only these 4 examples have been documented. I have been searching for evidence that these 1796 sabres were presented to the survivors of the Charge, but haven't been able to uncover any new evidence. Later photos of survivors show them with all sorts of swords, but I haven't yet found a photo of a survivor with one of these 1796 sabres.
Cheers,
Bryce