Cannon balls

[M ELEY]

Sorry, Fernando. I reread the article and it was a Spanish vessel, the El Gran Grifon, that wrecked off Stroms Hellier, Scotland, in 1588. The vast majority of the guns from that wreck (and, according to the article, the time period), the guns had been bored very poorly, with many that would have exploded if they had been used. They were bronze guns from Lisbon and were a small batch, apparently an experimental program to speed up production and cut costs. The chief gunfounder was an Italian named Bartolome de Somorriva, who came under serious criticism. In the years to come, the problem was addressed, but for this particular wrecked ship, the inspectors had looked the other way on her poor guns. Ironically, it was bad weather and a reef that claimed the ship, not a battle.

[fernando]

So El Gran Grifon wrecked when returning from the Gravelines battle. She belonged to the Invincible Armada fleet … some call it convoy, once the Spanish idea was not battling on sea but invade Britain with a powerful army; only 22 were war galleons, the rest 108 being merchant ships full of infantry for the assault.
Noteworthy is that, by the time these events occurred (1588), Portugal glorious days, on what touches naval might, were starting to weaken; the Filipes from Spain had taken control of the country on 1580 (till 1640) .
One of the first things the Spaniards did after taking over, a classic move, was to demilitarize Portugal, namely dismantling some arsenals, and taking command of others. It is written that 1000 cannons of the finest gunnery were remitted to Spain, as also several ships, which ended up being used to strenghten the said Invincible Armada. The personnel embarked in those ships were Portuguese, although the command was Spanish.
Naturally during this period, operational problems arose, as Portuguese (like any other would) did not feel comfortable working and fighting under foreign command.
So under the pressure put by Spanish to organize for extra gunnery production on an urgent basis and under unwilling ambience in the Portuguese foundries, aggravated by lack of qualified supervision, i wouldn’t be surprised that fresh material coming out of the foundries was eventually “second choice”.
Adding to this problematic, Somorriva was a notorious untrustworthy gun-founder.
I would then consider such bunches of crooked guns as a punctual war episode and not a standard procedure.
… As obviously i would admit any scholar would turn my story upside down but, as you know, one must say something to defend his club .

[M ELEY]

Excellent information, Fernando, and very well researched. I had forgotten to mention that the cannons in question were from Somorriva's foundries. You certainly know your cannons! I think you 'defended your club' well, my friend. I wasn't trying to imply that Spanish or Portuguese technology was defective at the time, merely that the constraints of war plus certain policies interfered with the normally exceptional process of cannon making. I need to read up on the Gravelines battles.

[fernando]

Originally Posted by M ELEY

... I need to read up on the Gravelines battles...

May i save you some time?

Indeed a part of this research was done for the subject in discussion. A nice work on artillery connected with the episode may be read
HERE
... despite the ommission of certain pages

The usual wikepedia article, concerning the battle, may be read
HERE

The portuguese version, for my surprise with a varied text, may be read
HERE

Very important for the desmistification of the battle, a portuguese view may be read
HERE

I assume the last two links constitute a problem for english speaking readers but, who knows, a good willing Portuguese friend in the neighbourhood will translate it for you, in case of interest .

Other details i took from a couple books in my micro library.
In short ...
According to the majority of historians, the Portuguese war vessels were the the Spanish Kingdom great expectation of success for their invasion of Britain. In fact, the Comander in chief of the fleet selected a Portuguese Galeon, São Martinho, for his flag ship. Nine of these twelve ships together with four galeasses from the Kingdom of Naples were the most powerful vessels in the fleet. Most of the remaining ships were normaly used for transport, having been equiped with artillery transferred from inland fortresses or smaller ships.
As already mentioned, the Spanish strategists were so confident that they would invade Britain with a relative facility, that they overlooked vital parts that were to be dealt on sea. In fact, the whole campaign was a disaster.

[M ELEY]

Thanks for the great links, Fernando. Of course I now remember this famous battle, as portrayed in the movie 'Elizabeth'. Drake's fireship attack was deadly, but the chief destroyer of the Spanish Armada was the horrid weather. That stretch of ocean around Scotland and Ireland has been claiming ships for centuries. It would seem that the main reasons England and Japan were never successfully invaded was because of none other than the angry seas. This respect for the tides is very apparent in Japanese mythology and legend.

[kronckew]

Originally Posted by M ELEY

... the main reasons England and Japan were never successfully invaded was because of none other than the angry seas. This respect for the tides is very apparent in Japanese mythology and legend.

even the great gaius julius caesar had trouble with the weather. his troops even refused to get on the boats for quite a spell. their initial landings were disastrous, and they left soon after - tho they of course spun that into a victory and a triumph for ol' gaius. the brits did pretty much what the japanese did to the mongols who tried to invade japan, tho the romans second attempt a hundred years later under vespasian was a bit more successful than the mongols second one. the romans came prepared that time and with better ships, the mongols not so much. the japanese learned from their initial experience. the celtic brits did not.

p.s. - the norman french successfully invaded in 1066. had not harold been a bit tired and short handed after forced march from his overwhelming victory over a separate invasion by vikings in the northeast a few days before, hastings and world history might have been a whole lot different.

ol' francis the duck's fire ships did very little direct damage, if any. it did scare the bejesus out of the spanish, and they essentially up-anchored and ran - straight into a storm. drake spent a significant part of the battle (which was actually spread out over quite a few days) looting a captured spanish ship rather than supporting the main english fleet. the spanish land commander in the netherlands was a bit hesitant about supplying the sea commander with his troops when the armada arrived, the delay proved fatal as they missed any good weather & gave the brits time to come up with a cunning plan. on both sides, cannon were basically ineffectual, doing little damage... the brits higher rate of fire, while psychologically impressive did little actual damage as the cannons were fairly light caliber. the heavier spanish ones didn't have the range, rate of fire or accuracy. the english long bow was likely more effective

good queen bess, after the 'victory' over the armada, had the fleet anchored and not only did not pay the sailors, but refused them permission to leave, many starved to death or died of disease. this of course did not apply to the officers.

many surviving spanish ships sailed around the top of britain and down to ireland, where they, out of supplies and water put ashore to gain help and food from their catholic brethren there, and were promptly slaughtered by the irish.

[fernando]

Originally Posted by kronckew

... on both sides, cannon were basically ineffectual, doing little damage... the brits higher rate of fire, while psychologically impressive did little actual damage as the cannons were fairly light caliber...

Indeed ... although the galleon São João, for one, was hit by 300 projectiles. Although it is recognizable that the superior fire capacity of the Portuguese (not Spanish) galleon São Martinho kept the Brit ships at distance. Contrary to what is said that the Armada fleet didn't shoot more than a couple volleys, flagship São Martinho sent off 200 pelouros only on the 2nd August, having been hit by 50 projectiles, some below the water level, which had to be plugged with lead plates by divers.
According to a relation of ammunitions listed at departure and arrival, São Martinho shot 47% of its pelouros, São Luis 60% and in other cases 87% were shot, from smaller galleons Agusta and Julia. It is therefore a myth that British ships could shoot more volleys than the Armada. It occurs that the number of ships that the main Armada galleons had to confrontate was much larger and the English were in numerical superiority. This is what explains that their projectiles hit more Armada ships and not the superiority of their gunners.
Despite in both sides actual war ships were in a rather inferior number than the total fleet boats, the English counted with the 34 galleons of the Queen squad, among 197 ships. The real battle was indeed fought bwetween these 34 vessels and the 9 Portuguese galleons, together with the 4 Naples galeasses. So the superiority of the British in actual war ships was considerable, only minimized by the fire capacity of each Portuguese galleon.
The real inferiority from the British side was their embarked infantry (15.551 men versus 27.365) but, as boarding operations were not relevant in such battle, this disadvantage became a vantage, as the difference in number was in terms of infantry, which had no role in combat

Originally Posted by kronckew

... good queen bess, after the 'victory' over the armada, had the fleet anchored and not only did not pay the sailors, but refused them permission to leave, many starved to death or died of disease...

Amazingly a similar situation ocurred with the Spaniards. By the time they returned from the battle some of the crews were already boarded for nine months as, during the fleet concentration in Lisbon before the departure, only the the crews of the Portuguese Crown were allowed to come ashore, having not been afected by a plague that spread aboard.
The situation was already dramatic even before any combat took place.