[Jim McDougall]

In the warfare in the times of the Crimean War (1853-56), the capture of cannons as trophies even more than their obvious importance as weapons to be reused in battle, was a well established objective. To 'lose' them in a battle was essentially a disgrace. In a battle where defense was no longer tenable, it was the duty of the gunners to 'spike' or disable the guns rather than allow them to be taken for reuse.

This military notion was essentially behind what became one of the most glorified, tragic, yet militarily inconsequential events in military history. This entire action in the Battle of Balaclava was the result of poor leadership, the obstinance of commanding officers, and this very notion about 'guns'.

In the defenses set up by the British in these areas near Balaclava, which were basically two valleys, North and South, separated by a long ridge called 'Causeway Heights' as the key supply road (Wozoronov Road) ran along the top of this terrain.
The British built 6 artillery redoubts along this escarpment, however only 4 were actually armed, while 5 and 6 were not. These were clumsily constructed and weak, armed with British 12 pounder naval guns and manned by Turks ((Warner, p.65).

In actions of earlier in these areas, while the British forces had scored some notable victory with the Heavy Brigade and infantry over Russian forces, a Russian field battery had captured these redoubts after they were abandoned by the Turks manning them.

In the scope of all this, the British commander overall was Lord Raglan, a venerable officer of the Napoleonic campaigns, who was situated in an elevated vantage point some 600 feet above the terrain of these valleys and the Causeway Heights.

To his dismay, he could see the Russians with artillery horses with lasso tackle preparing to remove the captured British guns from the redoubts (Woodham-Smith, p.231). This would not do! With this, he issued one of the most fateful orders in military history, to advance the Light Brigade to the Heights to prevent the Russians from carrying away the guns. The written order was given to the young ADC to the Heavy Cavalry commander Lord Lucan, Lt. Lewis Nolan, who excitedly rode down the terrain to deliver it to him.

Frustrated at having been held back through the days action, Nolan gave Lucan the order, which made no sense to him as he was situated in the lower terrain and could not see what guns Raglan was talking about. Overcome by anxious rage, Nolan made the impetuous, and fatal gesture pointing in the direction of the North Valley rather than specifying the Causeway Heights.
Rather than further discussing the order, despite it directing the forces into a valley heavily armed on all sides by the Russians, Lucan stubbornly ordered the advance.

This was the entire issue, the personal issues between the officers drove the failure to properly understand an order simply to stop the unseemly removal of the captured British guns which was offensive to the British Commander. There was no strategic or tactical importance specifically, and the order assumed that Lucan would know just what guns were meant.

As the cavalry advanced, at a certain distance it became apparent that they were not wheeling to the right, to the Causeway Heights, but instead riding straight into the North Valley into a suicidal gauntlet of Russian artillery on all sides!

As the brigades rode onward, the ranks were decimated in the horrific fire from all sides, the Heavy Brigade dropped back as the Light Brigade ahead rode into sure death. There was never a 'charge' ordered nor sounded (the trumpeter was now killed)....in fact there were lancers in front who reached the gun batteries with lances still in the buckets!

It was as if, the men of the Light Brigade had not expected this suicidal ride into blazing cannon, but expected to be directed into a flanking movement at some point. As they had not, and were fully into the hellish fire, the natural reaction is to get past it.....so it became a 'charge' out of pure necessity to get out of the line of fire. The entire point of this situation immortalized by Tennyson, "theirs was not to reason why, theirs was but to do and die".

In this thread, as I had mentioned earlier, I have hoped to learn more on the artillery aspects of this action in the Battle of Balaclava October 25, 1854.
While we know the British guns were naval twelve pounders, it is unclear how many were in the redoubts, and just what type of guns were they? It does not seem like they would have been on the usual deck carraiges as how would they be transported?

With the Russian artillery, what I have been trying to determine is, just what types of guns were they using, how many, and the types of ammunition being used (i.e. shot, shell, canister).
Also, were the Russians using the British guns in the redoubts or simply focused on taking them away?