Valley of the Shadow of Death

[toaster5sqn]

Jim, I believe the 1821 troopers blade was fullered while officers blades may have been pipeback as were infantry officers swords. Or the confusion could come from artillery officers swords which had an infantry blade but the light cavalry 3 bar hilt.

Robert

[Will M]

Jim I've occasionally seen souvenirs from the Crimean War at auction with old engraved plates or painted on. I've seen some horseshoes with silver fittings engraved.
Presentation swords of the Charge of the Light Brigade are the older 1796 pattern LC swords. Of course they could not use the swords they carried being current issue at the time.
I have trooper swords with correct early maker and inspection markings and regimental markings and would most likely have participated in the charges. I believe that is as close as one can get.

[Jim McDougall]

Robert and Will, thank you very much. After checking further in copies of "The British Cavalry Sword 1788-1912" (Richard Dellar, 2013) and "Swords of the British Army" (Brian Robson, 1985) I can recall some of the particulars on these light cavalry swords.

The M1821 light cavalry troopers saber indeed had a new type blade for both cut and thrust which was not with pipe back, while in many cases officers swords did have them. The production of these m1821 swords began in 1823, with about 6000 done by 1825. While there were some complaints about them by 1827, it was mostly about being 'too light' but the scabbards were most of the issue. It seems these complaints were finally set aside and the swords remained in use until the introduction of the M1853 (for both light and heavy cavalry troopers).

In these transitional times there surely was confusion on designations etc.

Richard Dellar discusses the 'Balaclava presentation swords' in a chapter of his book, and three of these swords which are all M1796 light cavalry sabers which all have oval escutcheons with "BALACLAVA OCTOBER25, 1854"
There are regimental markings on the guard bottom, two for 17th Lancers, one for 4th Hussars (4th Light Dragoons at time of charge).
It is believed these were likely issued by the Balaclava Commemoration Society, which was begin in 1875.

The unit markings it seems were intended to align with those of the men these were presented to, but do not seem purported to have been carried in the charge.

I agree with Will, swords with proper unit markings and other markings which set in correct period can possibly have been in the charge, but no way to prove without proper provenance.

In Dellar (op.cit. p.120; 13.6, 13.7) a M1821 light cavalry saber is shown as by Charles Reeves & Co. of Birmingham, with notation of 'Reeves hilt' . It says this form is believed to have started in 1829, which is about the time some of the consternation on these swords was taking place, partly noting the hilts were of concern. I have always wondered what the number 111 was for.
It is tempting to think perhaps numbering in test examples but no record of such tests are recorded, and these remained in service until arrival of the M1853.
Interestingly Reeves held the patent for the 'sandwich' application of the new grips to tang of the new M1853 sabers. It has been noted that some of the first examples of these had blades from Solingen by the maker Kirschbaum, as in this example to supply to troops departing for Crimea (op. cit. Dellar, p.136, pl.15.9 showing knights head mark).
Both of these types were on the field at Balaclava.

[Will M]

An 1821p HC 4th DG sword

[Jim McDougall]

Thank you Will! excellent example, especially with regiment markings.
These heavy cavalry versions of the 1821 swords are one of the tougher patterns to find, as I recall when I was collecting these back in the 70s.
It seems many of these ended up being repurposed into practice swords with rebated blades, and I think many in stores were lost in a fire in the Tower.

On the 25th, prior to the Light Brigade action, the Heavy Brigade was involved in action at Balaclava in quite a successful, as well as incredible battle against huge odds vs. the Russian army. With the Light Brigade advance into the North Valley the Heavy Brigade followed for a distance, but as the Light Brigade was decimated by the murderous fire from all sides, they were held back so as not to be lost as well.

[Jim McDougall]

In the warfare in the times of the Crimean War (1853-56), the capture of cannons as trophies even more than their obvious importance as weapons to be reused in battle, was a well established objective. To 'lose' them in a battle was essentially a disgrace. In a battle where defense was no longer tenable, it was the duty of the gunners to 'spike' or disable the guns rather than allow them to be taken for reuse.

This military notion was essentially behind what became one of the most glorified, tragic, yet militarily inconsequential events in military history. This entire action in the Battle of Balaclava was the result of poor leadership, the obstinance of commanding officers, and this very notion about 'guns'.

In the defenses set up by the British in these areas near Balaclava, which were basically two valleys, North and South, separated by a long ridge called 'Causeway Heights' as the key supply road (Wozoronov Road) ran along the top of this terrain.
The British built 6 artillery redoubts along this escarpment, however only 4 were actually armed, while 5 and 6 were not. These were clumsily constructed and weak, armed with British 12 pounder naval guns and manned by Turks ((Warner, p.65).

In actions of earlier in these areas, while the British forces had scored some notable victory with the Heavy Brigade and infantry over Russian forces, a Russian field battery had captured these redoubts after they were abandoned by the Turks manning them.

In the scope of all this, the British commander overall was Lord Raglan, a venerable officer of the Napoleonic campaigns, who was situated in an elevated vantage point some 600 feet above the terrain of these valleys and the Causeway Heights.

To his dismay, he could see the Russians with artillery horses with lasso tackle preparing to remove the captured British guns from the redoubts (Woodham-Smith, p.231). This would not do! With this, he issued one of the most fateful orders in military history, to advance the Light Brigade to the Heights to prevent the Russians from carrying away the guns. The written order was given to the young ADC to the Heavy Cavalry commander Lord Lucan, Lt. Lewis Nolan, who excitedly rode down the terrain to deliver it to him.

Frustrated at having been held back through the days action, Nolan gave Lucan the order, which made no sense to him as he was situated in the lower terrain and could not see what guns Raglan was talking about. Overcome by anxious rage, Nolan made the impetuous, and fatal gesture pointing in the direction of the North Valley rather than specifying the Causeway Heights.
Rather than further discussing the order, despite it directing the forces into a valley heavily armed on all sides by the Russians, Lucan stubbornly ordered the advance.

This was the entire issue, the personal issues between the officers drove the failure to properly understand an order simply to stop the unseemly removal of the captured British guns which was offensive to the British Commander. There was no strategic or tactical importance specifically, and the order assumed that Lucan would know just what guns were meant.

As the cavalry advanced, at a certain distance it became apparent that they were not wheeling to the right, to the Causeway Heights, but instead riding straight into the North Valley into a suicidal gauntlet of Russian artillery on all sides!

As the brigades rode onward, the ranks were decimated in the horrific fire from all sides, the Heavy Brigade dropped back as the Light Brigade ahead rode into sure death. There was never a 'charge' ordered nor sounded (the trumpeter was now killed)....in fact there were lancers in front who reached the gun batteries with lances still in the buckets!

It was as if, the men of the Light Brigade had not expected this suicidal ride into blazing cannon, but expected to be directed into a flanking movement at some point. As they had not, and were fully into the hellish fire, the natural reaction is to get past it.....so it became a 'charge' out of pure necessity to get out of the line of fire. The entire point of this situation immortalized by Tennyson, "theirs was not to reason why, theirs was but to do and die".

In this thread, as I had mentioned earlier, I have hoped to learn more on the artillery aspects of this action in the Battle of Balaclava October 25, 1854.
While we know the British guns were naval twelve pounders, it is unclear how many were in the redoubts, and just what type of guns were they? It does not seem like they would have been on the usual deck carraiges as how would they be transported?

With the Russian artillery, what I have been trying to determine is, just what types of guns were they using, how many, and the types of ammunition being used (i.e. shot, shell, canister).
Also, were the Russians using the British guns in the redoubts or simply focused on taking them away?

[Norman McCormick]

Hi,
An 1821 LC sabre marked to Osborn, a mid Victorian regimental, Ayrshire Yeomanry, pillbox hat of the type common to the British Army of the time and a few photos one showing an 1821 pattern being worn and a retouched and coloured photo of Cornet Wilkin of the 11th Hussars. Both photos are by Fenton.
Regards,
Norman.

[Jim McDougall]

Originally Posted by Will M

An 1821p HC 4th DG sword

I had missed commenting on this Will,
This is amazing to see one of these with these markings! which certainly suggests one of the swords at Balaclava. The 4th Dragoon Guards were of course part of the Heavy Brigade, whose clash with up to 3000 Russians with their number of 600+ on the morning of October 25, 1854 was nothing short of remarkable.
In "Nolan of Balaclava" H. Moyse-Bartlett (1971, p.212) it is noted that "..among such tightly packed horsemen, the sword was difficult to wield.The Russian weapons were blunter than the English".

In "The Crimean War" (R.L.V.French-Blake, 1972, p.77) "..,the redcoats hacked their way through the grey enemy masses until the Russian force began to sway and melt".

These seem contrasting in the view toward the use of the sword, with suggestions of the British swords being blunt. Most other accounts note extremely effective results with British saber cuts in this action.

It is interesting to note the disciplined training of the British troopers in this account from a wounded Heavy Brigade dragoon, "...I had just cut five (a body cut) at a Russian, and the damned fool never guarded at all, but hit me on the head".
This was recounted by Sir Evelyn Wood regarding the formal style of sword fighting taught to British cavalrymen. A man would stab or slash first, then return the sword to a guarding position to protect against his enemys return blow. Each of the prescribed cuts or slashes was designated by a number.

From "Death or Glory" (Robert Edgerton, 1999, p.223) citing Sir Evelyn Wood, "The Crimea in 1854 and 1894", 1895.

It is amazing to think of the descriptions of this action with the Heavy cavalry literally disappearing into the sea of grey coats, then to see them all disperse away from them. Had this combat been properly supported by the Light Brigade at the time, the outcome at Balaclava would have been quite different.