Fernando, no towel throwing allowed
The term use is in this case simply a matter of perspective, and relatively moot it would seem if it brought such consternation.It would seem the word was unnecessary in the title but I used it to suggest the issues resulting from the notoriously poor powder, and the point of trying to find out why it was so.
Agreed that the Dupont was more likely the powder being sought, which ironically was that which the defenders had originally at the Alamo.In their case, their supply of that powder was depleted when the number of the contingent left there on the Matamoros expedition prior to the siege. They took most of this 'good' powder, leaving the unfortunate defenders with what remained, and the store of Mexican powder left by Cos in December.
With the Dupont powder, which was indeed from Delaware, it had been notably sold and traded throughout the states, which certainly included the New Orleans entrepot, where the barrels of powder on the Pelican had originated.
The production of gunpowder of course, must be regarded as appropriately volatile, and in volume production such as was carried out at Dupont, the inevitability of explosion must have been a constant threat.
The Mexican powder left in the Alamo, in further reading, I found was seriously damaged even to add to its poor quality, by the effects of what is known as 'creeping damp'. This natural situation is something well known in Texas and in which the dampness permeates relentlessly regardless of precautions attempted.
This same circumstance was why the men left at the Alamo were caught as they slept with guns unloaded, the same dampness would have effected powder left in the pans. By the time they reacted, the compound was overrun, and they had little to do but try to flee. These defenders were not the seasoned veterans and frontiersmen who indeed comprised the less predominant faction of the contingent, and those fewer do seem to have tried to stand as the others fled.
It does seem that historians are often not entirely correct on many aspects of this tragic event, and the true number of defenders are not accurately known, but simply estimated.
It is the same with the numbers of Mexican forces, typically largely exaggerated by those emphasizing the more heroic perspectives of the siege itself. However, this same embellishment seems to concern the numbers of Mexican casualties.
As with much of the research I have done here, my primary source has been "Exodus from the Alamo", Philip Thomas Tucker, 2010, where it notes the accounts of Santa Anna's 2nd in command Gen. Vincente Filisola, who regarded the Alamo engagement as 'useless'.
Tucker notes on p.3, "... while historians have grossly inflated the number of Mexican losses, the Filisola document shows that most of the attackers losses were due to fratricide. In all truth the Mexicans lost fewer men than traditional documents have claimed : in all less than three hundred casualties.
The large percentage of fratricide casualties means that the entire Alamo garrison may have killed or wounded barely a hundred of their opponents.".
My comment on the percentage of such Mexican casualties being as much as 90% was admittedly far beyond what numbers here reveal, and probably from my initial reaction of surprise at this clearly remarkable revelation.
While clearly the gunpowder issues of the thread topic, while playing a key role in many dynamics of this historic and tragic event, the true 'dilemma', at least for me, has been trying to better understand it.
While the tragedy was as put by Gen. Filisola, a useless engagement, the heroism of the forces on both sides was indisputable.