[Peter Hudson]

PIRACY IN INDIAN WATERS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
RUBY MALONI*

From https://www.jstor.org/stable/44142635?seq=2

During the seventeenth century piracy in Indian Ocean was common and in forms according to the social and political context. Within the compleat warp and weft of Asian maritime trade, this phenomenon has to be understood as a matter of shadings rather than clear distinctions. For a long time this has been de-emphasised or passed over lightly by most historians as tales of freebooters and buccaneers. But recently interest has been focussed on both separately and as part of the debate on the relations between the east Asian trade and European penetration in Asia in the pre-colonial phase.

The aim of this paper is to underline and examine some of the facets in the Western Indian Ocean, especially as it emerges from the evidence Surat Factory Records. Among the usual staid reports and placid narrative a refrain of piracy is discernible. Two significant aspects are to do with Malabar 'pirates', and Indian shipping at the port of Surat. Both were woven into the system of protection and coercion introduced into the waters by European maritime powers. Effort has been made in this paper to keep away from an Eurocentric paradigm as well as a drastic reaction to it.

Piracy has been called "an occupational disease of commerce." In this period and area, piratical operations manifested themselves variedly and widely. It was rife in the China seas, especially in the period of the Ming dynasty. The dreaded Wako pirates, based in Japan, operated freely along the Gulf of Siam and China's southern and eastern coastline. In the Arabian Sea, the Yarubi (Omani) Navy emerged as a powerful force. By 1650 Muscat held by Portugal fell to them and in the next fifteen years they swept the Portuguese out of all east African settlements except Mozambique. Bombay, Diu and Bassein were plundered by them.

Matters were further complicated by the incursion of European buccaneers who made Madagascar and the Comoro Islands their base and preyed on Indian shipping, their main intent was the plunder of specie and spices. While riverine Bengal faced the depredations of Portuguese freebooters along with the Maghs of Arakan, west coast shipping was harassed by the pirates of north-west Kathiawar. Many merchants were on the pirate fringe. European private merchants and 'Interlopers' were among those who indulged in piracy if the opportunity presented itself. This period witnessed the rise of new nuclei of naval power in western Indian waters, such as the respective navies of the Zamorin of Calicut, Angre and the Sidi of Janjira.]

The sixteenth century was a watershed between peaceful trading and armed trading in the Indian Ocean. The . Portuguese had the dubious distinction of introducing politics into the Ocean. From the very beginning the Portuguese discovery of the Cape route to India was accompanied by a determination to place coercive methods before those of normal peaceful commerce. Pedro Alvarez Cabral's instructions in 1500 were that if ships trading with Calicutwere encountered he would take possession of them, " of their merchandise and property and also of the Moors who are in the ships."

Every Indian ship had to buy a cartaz (Traders licence) if it was to avoid seizure and confiscation of its cargo. The revenue earned through this redistributive enterprise was substantial, and made the Estado da India a piratical state or in Braudels terms, simply customs officials'.

The violent overture of the Portuguese was taken up by the English and the Dutch, continuing the undisguised use of sea power and payment for
protection en route. In the seventeenth century, indigenous shipping in the Indian Ocean would be equipped in many instances with passes from several European nations. The Surat Factory Records contain clear references to the capture of Indian vessels without English passes, and the organisation of kafilas or convoys with an aim at control. By 1630 the English fleet at Surat was trying to protect Indian ships plying the Red Sea trade, such as the Shahi, after richly laden ships like the Musahi had been seized by the Portuguese. Forty years later, the English continued to escort Indian vessels in this area, particularly Aurangzeb's Mocha 'junks'.

Convoys were organised with a dual purpose: to protect against pirates, but more to ensure that the protected ships traded according to their conditions. Thus the cost of the pass was sheer unreciprocal extortion, first by the Portuguese, then the Dutch and the English. Protection and coercion were contradictory, yet two sides of the same coin. Both were exercised in ample measure, and the play of free trade and open competition vs domination and
operation of monopolies makes for a significant study.

Important implications lie in the forms of resistance offered against the passes, i.e. a monopolistic system. A challenge on a combative level emanated from the 'Malabaris', who were skilled and determined enough to avoid this control. This is the traditional maritime group mentioned most often in the Factory Records. Throughout the sixteenth century the Portuguese had treated ships from Calicut, which they called 'Malavares', as pirates and attacked them on sight. The Kunjalis were the 'corsairs' or corsario of the Portuguese records. The Malabaris ,were described by Careri as the most ferocious of pirates, consisting of men from 'nationalities' like "the Moors, Gentiles, Jews and Christians". Mostly they were undefined to their contemporary European observers and projected as a monolithic group. In functional terms some were pirates, some guerrilla warriors and many inoffensive traders.

Most of the Malabaris belonged to the seafaring merchant community of Moplahs. Heads of powerful Moplah families armed their own fleets; among them was Muhammad Marakkar who received the title of Kunjali from Zamorin. Becoming his naval auxiliaries, the Moplah Kunjalis clearly did take part in politics at sea. But documentation about them is insufficient. Their area of operations was centered at the northernmost part of Malabar, ruled by the Kolattiri Raja with his power base at Cannanore. From the kottakal river to Cranganore stretched the lands of Zamorin with his port at Calicut. The coastal creeks, lagoons and estuaries of these two domains harboured the Malabar 'pirates'. Porakkad, Ponnani, Kappatt, Pantalayini, Kollam and Chaliyam offered sites for clandestine activities. Malabar's main export was pepper, which the Portuguese wished to monopolise. The Moplahs had no choice but resistance, at which they were remarkably successful. Huge amounts of pepper were transported outside the Portuguese system by local traders. In Malabar and Cañara, in the first decade of the seventeenth century only about 1/10 of the total production went to Lisbon. Armed ships carried cargoes of pepper, cardamom and cinnamon to Gujarat, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the Maldive Islands and Sri Lanka and to the Coromandel - with or without cartazes. Rice was traded by sea, up and down the west coast of India. Surat had old ties with Mangalore, Calicut, Cannanore and other Malabar ports. In the mid-seventeenth century, it was the major exporting point for Malabar pepper to Mocha, Muscat and Basra.

The Malabar's naval strength showed an increased vigour in direct challenges to European naval power in the seventeenth century. In fact, some historians hold that the Portuguese were exhausted by the naval war waged against them. Sambuks and almadias sailed the length of the west coast, escorted by Malabar paraos. These were fast small galleys of approx. 60 tuns, manned on each side by 20-10 oarsmen; they could carry 3 or 4 pieces of artillery and more than 100 archers or arquebusiers. They were open decked and lateen rigged, with one or two masts. The Malabar sailors who were intrepid seaman could outmanoeuvre bigger vessels, their common mode of attack to throw 'fire pots' on the deck of the enemy ship.

To the English factors the Malabris continued to be a tangible threat and obstructive presence. This was seized as an excuse for condoning or even initiating seizure of Indian merchant vessels and freebooting on the high seas.

As an incentive to the freighted English ships for this kind of activity, the Company servants offered 1/6 of the loot to the commander and crew. President Matthew Andrewes implicitly instructed the commander of the American Frigate , "The Mallabars that you may encounter, we desire you if possible not to let escape, but to seize on the vessels, empty the goods, and then fire them, setting the men on shore the next land you can conveniently come at. For your so doing, 1/6th part is yours, and the ship's Company's share." Increasing European piracy in the Arabian Sea became a source of recurring conflict with the Mughal authorities, the most prominent example of which was the capture of Aurangzeb's ship Ganj-i Sawai by the English pirate Henry Every. It was commonly believed in Surat that the servants of the English factory had dealings with English pirates. The Emperor's retaliative measures against the English factors highlight a system of balance of threats.

In about 1650 the merchant navy of Surat contained 50 ships, large and well built. By 1701 the number of sea-going ships in Surat was at least 112. Much of the Indian shipping at Surat belonged to the aristocracy, the large princely ship declining in importance only in the later seventeenth century. In respect of freight traffic, the Mughals realizing the potential of the westward trade financed the building of ships. This reduced Indian dependence on foreign vessels but also made them vulnerable at sea and more reliant on European naval escorts. The number of vessels captured commensurately pushed up the coast of protection. However, this protection was not really adequate. Exasperated at the breakdown of protection on the pilgrimage route, Aurangzeb ordered Sir John Gayer, the 'old' Governor and his fellow servants to be thrown into prison, an episode taken advantage of by the 'new' Company's Governor Sir Nicholas Waite (1700-08).

At Masulipatam also, Aurangzeb's demand to Sir William Norris was to give Protection to Mughal shipping. Whenever a dispute broke out between one of the trading companies
and the Mughal authorities, the first step taken by the latter was to cut-off the supplies. The reply of the factors was to make prizes of Indian vessels. There were many instances of such a policy of brinkmanship. In so far as the European factories until they developed into fortified settlements- were at the mercy of the Mughal, there was a balance of threats.
In a discussion on piracy the driving forces behind certain questions have to be examined. European efforts at monopoly, increased piracy in Indian waters, as traders whom they dispossessed were forced to use this alternative. But only certain gProups like the Malabaris put forward resistance, and that too, in particular form, while others structured a modus vivendi of indirect partnerships with Europeans officials or merchants. Piracy was also a natural outgrowth of European rivalries. Ships of one nation waylaid another, even if they were not in a state of war, or had an official commission.

Piracy itself was an outcome of a vast improvement in naval and military techniques in the ships operating in the Indian Ocean.

Satish Chandra has argued that the corsairs could only succeed where their ships could outmanoeuvre or outgun an ordinary ship. In this context K.N. Chaudhuri's reference to " a clear naval Portuguese superio"ity over Asian ships" has to be re-examined. The Vasco da Gama period in Asian history, as Steensgaard names it, was not a uniform period of European naval superiority. Asian naval techniques and strategies were neither backward nor passive. Portuguese ships were not necessarily bigger than Asian; but they did carry cannon as a matter of course, while at first Asian ships did not. Also, big was not always better.

Peter Hudson.